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Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897) 
YING KHAI LIEW* A. INTRODUCTION	  
Over the century or so since Rochefoucauld v Boustead1 was decided, the case has 
become central to the application of the maxim ‘equity will not allow a statute to be 
used as an instrument of fraud’ in the context of section 53(1)(b) of the Law of 
Property Act 1925. By virtue of section 53(1)(b), ‘a declaration of trust respecting any 
land … must be manifested and proved by some writing signed by some person who 
is able to declare such a trust’.2 However, in the appropriate circumstances, a trust 
may still be enforced against one who receives land subject to an oral declaration of 
trust despite the lack of proof of writing. Indeed, so central has Rochefoucauld been in 
this area of law that the enforcement of such a trust has come to be known as an 
application of ‘the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead’. 
                                                
* Gratitude is due to Professor Craig Rotherham and Dr Christine Davis for their constructive 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
1 The report commonly cited is [1897] 1 Ch 196 (CA). However, various other reports – which are 
largely consistent between themselves – supplement this main report with vital information for the 
purposes of this chapter. At the Court of Appeal level, these are: (1896) 13 TLR 118, (1896) 45 WR 
272, (1897) 75 LT 502 and (1897) 66 LJ Ch 74. Only the Law Times report will be cited below where 
it is necessary to depart from the Official Report. 
2 This more succinctly replaced s 7 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, which provided that ‘all declarations 
… of trusts or confidences of any lands … shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by 
the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust’. References in this chapter to s 7 instead of s 
53(1)(b) are merely contextual, and can otherwise be read interchangeably. 
 Unfortunately the exact facts of Rochefoucauld have eluded many legal 
scholars. As a result, a number of potentially damaging analytical gaps exist in our 
understanding of this seminal case. For instance, while most scholars consider that the 
trust which arose in Rochefoucauld was a constructive trust, some have contended 
that the trust was an express trust. This uncertainty not only frustrates taxonomical 
efforts to rationalise the law governing various types of trust; it also obscures the true 
meaning of ‘fraud’ when this term is used in the context of the Rochefoucauld 
doctrine. 
This chapter aims to plug these analytical gaps by re-analysing 
Rochefoucauld and the doctrine to which the case gives its name. Part B. closely 
scrutinises the facts of the case and concludes that the trust which arose there was 
constructive in nature. Part C. then explores the theoretical basis of this constructive 
trust. This discussion then forms the basis of the analysis of the Rochefoucauld 
doctrine in parts D. and E., which suggest a definition of ‘fraud’ and establish the 
relationship between ‘fraud’ and the constructive trust imposed in the case.  
 
B. REJECTING	   THE	   EXPRESS	   TRUST	   CONCLUSION	   IN	  
ROCHEFOUCAULD:	  AN	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  THE	  FACTS	  
 
 The essence of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead is rooted in the oft-quoted 
words of Lindley LJ’s judgment in the Court of Appeal3: 
[T]he Statute of Frauds does not prevent the proof of a fraud; and … it is a fraud on 
the part of a person to whom land is conveyed as a trustee, and who knows it was so 
conveyed, to deny the trust and claim the land himself. Consequently, notwithstanding 
the statute, it is competent for a person claiming land conveyed to another to prove by 
parol evidence that it was so conveyed upon trust for the claimant, and that the 
grantee, knowing the facts, is denying the trust and relying upon the form of 
conveyance and statute, in order to keep the land himself. 
 
As Lindley LJ indicates, a defendant must have taken a conveyance of land ‘as a 
trustee’ before ‘fraud’ – whatever this term means – can come into play. In most 
cases, it is clear that the defendant did take ‘as a trustee’. However, close analysis of 
the unusual facts of Rochefoucauld reveals that an express trust could not possibly 
have arisen. 
(1) The Facts 
In 1868, the claimant, the Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld, was the registered owner of 
certain coffee estates in Ceylon known as the Delmar estates. The estates were subject 
to a mortgage vested in a Dutch company. This was most likely a mortgage in the 
classical sense where the legal title to the land was transferred to the mortgagee, 
leaving the mortgagor with nothing more than an equity of redemption.4 The 
mortgagee wanted to call in the mortgage, but the Comtesse was unable to repay the 
mortgage debt. So she entered an agreement with the defendant, Boustead, and 
another man, Duff, under which they agreed to purchase the estates from the Dutch 
                                                
3 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 206 (emphases added). His Lordship delivered the joint judgment of 
the Court of Appeal which also included Lord Halsbury LC and AL Smith LJ. 
4 K Gray and SF Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edn (Oxford, OUP, 2008) para 6.1.6, fn 2. 
 company and to hold these on trust for her, subject to her repayment of their outlay.5 
Duff later pulled out of the arrangement, but Boustead went ahead. It was agreed that 
he would bid at the Dutch company’s auction of the estates. If and when he won the 
bidding, the Comtesse would not insist on her equity of redemption, with the result 
that he would only have to pay the Dutch company the price sufficient to cover her 
mortgage debt and expenses.6  
It is unclear why the Comtesse wanted the estates to be sold by auction 
instead of securing an agreement with the company to the same effect from the start,7 
since the classic context of an auction of a mortgaged property is a forced sale.8 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the company was not a party to the initial agreement, 
although it did later sign an agreement to sell the estates at the agreed price.9 
The arrangement was carried out and Boustead became the registered owner 
of the estates in 1873.10 He financed the bulk of his payment by an immediate 
remortgage of the estates to the Dutch company.11 Without the Comtesse’s 
                                                
5 Throughout this chapter, this agreement will be referred to as the ‘initial agreement’. 
6 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 197–98. 
7 The headnote of the Official Report merely states that the arrangement involving the auction was 
made ‘[t]o obviate some difficulties which arose’: ibid.  
8 In recounting the facts, Lindley LJ observed that the parties’ arrangement was designed to avoid the 
Comtesse’s recently-divorced husband, Mr Cavendish, enforcing the interest he acquired in the estates 
under the decree of the Divorce Court: Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 75 LT 504–05. It is thus a plausible 
explanation that the sale by auction was to give an appearance to Mr Cavendish that the estates were 
being sold absolutely to Mr Boustead, with the Comtesse retaining no interest in the estates. 
9 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 75 LT 505. 
10 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 205–06.  
11 Ibid, 198. 
 knowledge, Boustead then repeatedly mortgaged – and eventually sold – the estates.12 
A considerable surplus remained from the sale on which she sought an account,13 and 
the Court held that Boustead could not invoke section 7 to deny her beneficial 
interest, for that would be to use the statute as an ‘instrument of fraud’.14 
(2) The Analysis 
 
In a recent essay,15 William Swadling has suggested that section 53(1)(b) merely 
provides a ‘rule … of evidence’16 which is ‘disapplied’ on a finding of ‘fraud’, ‘with 
the result that there would be nothing standing in the way of the express trust’s 
“validity”.’17 He concludes that section 7 was indeed ‘disapplied’, thus leading the 
Court in Rochefoucauld to enforce the oral express trust directly.18 However, there 
appears to be no express oral trust which the Court in Rochefoucauld could have 
enforced at all. For an express trust to exist, whether it is declared orally or in written 
form, there must be a settlor who declares the trust, and a settlor can only declare a 
trust over an interest which he owns: he cannot declare a trust of property that he does 
not have. On the facts of Rochefoucauld it appears that none of the parties could 
                                                
12 Ibid, 204. 
13 Ibid, 204. 
14 Ibid, 206. 
15 W Swadling, ‘The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive 
and Resulting Trusts (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 95. 
16 Ibid, 104. 
17 Ibid, 105. 
18 See too JE Penner, The Law of Trusts, 7th edn (Oxford, OUP, 2010) para 6.10. 
 possibly have acted as settlor. The three possible candidates for the role of settlor will 
now be considered. 
(a) The Comtesse as the Settlor? 
One possibility is that the Comtesse was the settlor of the oral express trust. She 
would have been capable of settling the trust if she was indeed the transferor of the 
estates to Boustead. This view is given some credence by Simon Gardner’s analysis of 
Rochefoucauld, although he treats the trust as constructive.19 His observation that the 
Comtesse who was ‘the stipulated beneficiary was also the transferor’,20 leaves open 
the possibility that it was she who settled the oral express trust. 
This possibility proves to be unsustainable on the facts, because the Comtesse 
was not capable of transferring – let alone settling – the estates. At first sight, the 
reports of the appellate decision say little concerning the Comtesse’s substantive 
rights, leaving room to speculate that she still had full ownership of the property. 
However, the reports of the first-instance decision not only reveal that the Dutch 
company was ‘in possession as mortgagees’21; they also confirm that it sold the 
estates to Boustead using its ‘power of sale as mortgagees’.22 The inevitable inference 
from this is that the Comtesse’s interest was limited to an equity of redemption. Her 
limited rights in the estates all along made it impossible for her to have transferred to 
Boustead what he obtained in 1873 – the absolute title of the estates free from the 
                                                
19 S Gardner, An Introduction to the Law of Trusts, 2nd edn (Oxford, OUP, 2003) 90. 
20 Ibid, 87, fn 12. 
21 Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1896) 65 LJ Ch 794 (Ch D). 
22 Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1896) 74 LT 783 (Ch D). 
 mortgage. Thus, her consent to – and even her initiation of – the conveyance to 
Boustead could not result in her being the settlor of an express trust.  
It is noteworthy that Gardner has since admitted to ‘overlook[ing] the fact that 
the intended beneficiary in [Rochefoucauld] was not also the transferor’.23 Equally, 
nothing in Swadling’s article24 suggests that the Comtesse was the settlor of the trust. 
This possibility can, therefore, be ruled out. 
(b) The Dutch Company as the Settlor? 
Another possibility is to view the Dutch company as the settlor of the oral express 
trust. A measure of support for this view may be gleaned from another of Gardner’s 
works, despite his constructive trust analysis. He suggests that ‘the transferor (the 
Dutch company) intended the transferee (Boustead) to hold the property on trust for 
the Comtesse de la Rochefoucauld’.25 Proponents of the express trust analysis might 
surmise that this intention made the Dutch company the settlor. After all, the Court of 
Appeal did say that Boustead was ‘conveyed’ the land ‘as a trustee’,26 and it was the 
Dutch company which conveyed the land to Boustead.  
(i) A factual analysis 
                                                
23 S Gardner, ‘Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts’ in Mitchell (ed) (n 15) 68, fn 19. 
24 Swadling (n 15). 
25 Ibid, 68 (emphasis added). 
26 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 206. The phrase ‘as a trustee’ surely leaves open the prior question 
of the nature of the trust which makes the defendant a trustee; but for the sake of argument we shall 
proceed as if this referred to an express trust. 
 It is undisputed that a settlor of an express trust must have a sufficiently certain 
intention to create the trust.27 It is not at all obvious that such an intention can be 
attributed to the Dutch company. On the facts as recounted by Lindley LJ,28 the initial 
agreement was reached between the Comtesse and Boustead sometime between 1868, 
when the Dutch company wished to call in the mortgage, and 1871, when Boustead 
and the Dutch company signed an agreement for sale to effectuate the initial 
agreement. The Dutch company’s involvement would thus appear to be separate from, 
subsequent to, and subject to the initial agreement between the Comtesse and 
Boustead: it was not a party to the initial agreement. In fact, the Dutch company 
appears to have been a disinterested party vis-à-vis the trust arrangement. This is seen 
in that it sold the estates by auction, whereby Boustead had to submit the winning bid 
before he could ‘enter into an agreement with the company to purchase the estates … 
at a price sufficient to cover their mortgage debt and expenses’.29 Clearly, therefore, 
the Dutch company was only interested in recouping its mortgage debt, and did not 
intend to create a trust for the benefit of the Comtesse. 
(ii) A theoretical analysis 
Could it be argued that it does not matter what the Dutch company actually wanted, 
provided that it agreed – as it did – to give effect to the initial agreement by selling 
the estates to Boustead for the sum owing on the Comtesse’s security? It is a trite 
observation that a settlor may declare a trust over property only up to the extent of his 
own initial interest in that property; and one cannot grant an interest wider than the 
                                                
27 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148, 49 ER 58. 
28 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 75 LT 505. 
29 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 197. 
 interest that one owns. In finding for the Comtesse, the Court of Appeal in 
Rochefoucauld recognised her absolute equitable interest in the Delmar estates. 
‘[A]lthough [the Comtesse] admit[ted Boustead’s] lien on the property for his 
advances,’ the Court clearly viewed her ‘as the defendant’s cestui que trust’.30 In 
addition, the account of Boustead’s dealings with the Delmar estates was to ‘be an 
account as between a trustee and his cestui que trust, not an account as between 
mortgagor and mortgagee’.31 It follows that, for the Dutch company to have been the 
settlor, it must first have been the absolute beneficial owner of the estates. However, 
this precondition is not met on the facts of Rochefoucauld, as seen through two 
different but related perspectives. 
First, the sale of the Delmar estates through the exercise of the Dutch 
company’s power of sale32 may be contrasted with the situation where land is being 
sold pursuant to an order of foreclosure. An order of foreclosure may be obtained only 
with the court’s permission,33 and it ‘vest[s] the ownership of, and the beneficial title 
to, the land, for the first time, in the [mortgagee]’.34 Had the Dutch company obtained 
an order of foreclosure, it would, as the absolute owner of the estates, have been 
capable of settling the property upon trust. Given that it sold as mortgagee, however, 
it is clear that no such order was obtained by the Dutch company.  
                                                
30 Ibid, 209. 
31 Ibid, 212. 
32 See the text to n 22. 
33 Ness v O’Neil [1916] 1 KB 706 (CA) 709. 
34 Heath v Pugh (1881) 6 QBD 345 (CA) 360 (emphases added), affd (1882) LR 7 App Cas 235 (HL). 
 Secondly, the Comtesse’s equity of redemption subsisted all along in the 
Delmar estates, even up to the point when the estates were transferred to Boustead. 
Unless a mortgagor’s equity of redemption is foreclosed, ‘[t]he interest of the land … 
remain[s] in the mortgagor’.35 Furthermore, ‘[a]n equity of redemption has always 
been considered as an estate in the land … and therefore cannot be considered as a 
mere right only’.36 As Bowen LJ observed in Marquess of Northampton v Pollock,37 
‘equity regards the mortgaged property as security only for money, and will permit of 
no attempt to clog, fetter, or impede the borrower's right to redeem and to rescue what 
was, and still remains in equity his own.’ Therefore, the Dutch company could not 
have expressly settled the Delmar estates on an express trust, even though it possessed 
the legal title to the estates as mortgagee. It was obliged to respect the Comtesse’s 
equity of redemption in this regard; and the obligation remained binding throughout, 
even though the Comtesse gave up that equity pursuant to her agreement with 
Boustead. 
(iii) A further analytical inconsistency 
There is further evidence from the development of the law post-Rochefoucauld that 
rules out the analysis of the Dutch company as the settlor. In trusts texts, two factual 
situations are distinguished when discussing the ‘fraud’ exception to section 53(1)(b): 
the bipartite case, where A conveys land to B on an oral trust for A; and the tripartite 
case, where X conveys land to Y on an oral trust for Z. If the Dutch company were the 
settlor then Rochefoucauld would be a tripartite case, involving the Dutch company as 
                                                
35 Casborne v Scarfe (1737) 1 Atk 603, 605–06; 26 ER 377, 380. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Marquess of Northampton v Pollock (1890) 45 Ch D 190 (CA) 215. 
 settlor (X), Boustead as trustee (Y) and the Comtesse as the beneficiary (Z). 
Rochefoucauld would then be conclusive authority for supporting Z’s claim to the 
trust property. However, the application of the position in tripartite cases is far from 
settled, the dominant view even appearing to be against third party enforceability.38 
Thus, for instance, John Feltham warns that, if Z may enforce the oral trust where Y 
refuses to carry it out, ‘then the operation of section 53(1)(b) is correspondingly 
reduced, biting only in a case where [Y] orally declares himself trustee of Blackacre 
for [Z].’39 Indeed, Rochefoucauld has only ever been considered as an authority which 
affects bipartite cases. As Hanbury and Martin observes40: ‘Rochefoucauld v 
Boustead should not be regarded as [an authority to support Z’s claim] because 
effectively [X] arranged with [Y] that [Y] would buy from the mortgagee and hold on 
trust for [X].’ Hence the treatment afforded by these commentators to Rochefoucauld 
is also consistent with the view that the Dutch company could not have been the 
settlor. 
(c) John Boustead as the Settlor? 
The last possibility is the most promising for those who favour the express trust 
analysis. This takes the defendant, Boustead, to be the settlor of the trust. On this 
                                                
38 See TG Youdan, ‘Formalities for Trusts of Land, and the Doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead’ 
(1984) 43 CLJ 306; JD Feltham, ‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties’ [1987] Conveyancer 246; TG 
Youdan, ‘Informal Trusts and Third Parties: A Response’ [1988] Conveyancer 267. See also JE Martin, 
Hanbury and Martin: Modern Equity, 18th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), para 3-005, fn 23; 
Penner (n 18) para 6.11; D Hayton, P Matthews and C Mitchell, Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts 
and Trustees 18th edn (London, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) paras 12.70–12.72; C Mitchell, 
Hayton and Mitchell: Commentary and Cases on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, 13th edn 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) paras 3.64–3.66. 
39 Feltham (n 38) 247. 
40 Hanbury and Martin (n 38) para 3.005, fn 25. 
 view, Boustead declared himself trustee for the benefit of the Comtesse after41 the 
estates were transferred to him from the Dutch company. This approach is endorsed 
by James Penner, who takes Rochefoucauld to be ‘a self-declaration case’ in which 
‘Boustead … was the settlor of the trust’.42 Swadling also takes this view when he 
states that the Comtesse’s oral testimony proved ‘a declaration of trust by the 
defendant in her favour’.43  
(i) Inconsistency on the facts 
From the facts recounted by Swadling, it may not be immediately obvious that 
Boustead could not have declared the oral express trust over the Delmar estates. He 
notes that Boustead bought the estates in 1873, and subsequently mortgaged the 
estates ‘in 1876, 1877 and 1879, without the knowledge of the claimant’.44 This 
account appears to rely solely on the headnotes of the Official Reports.45 However, it 
fails to note that Boustead had ‘immediately remortgaged the estates to the Dutch 
company for £53,000, so that his actual payment out of pocket was under £5,000’.46 
Even assuming that this arrangement was done with the full knowledge of the 
Comtesse, the immediacy of the remortgaging would have made it impossible for 
                                                
41 It is not possible to endorse an express trust analysis if we say that the relevant declaration occurred 
prior to Boustead's obtaining the transfer of the estates, since an express declaration of trust of future 
property is void. See further, part C(2). 
42 Penner (n 18) para 6.12. However, he says little else to justify this view. 
43 Swadling (n 15) 113 (emphasis added). 
44 Ibid, 97. 
45 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 198. 
46 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 75 LT 505. 
 Boustead to have declared a trust over the unencumbered beneficial interest of the 
estates for the Comtesse’s benefit. 
There are two possible replies to this. The first is based on the fact that ‘[t]he 
estates were sold … many years ago’ and the Comtesse claimed to be entitled only to 
the ‘considerable surplus [which] remained [from the proceeds of sale]’.47 This may 
appear to indicate that the Comtesse had admitted that her beneficial rights were held 
subject to the Dutch company’s rights under the remortgage, leaving open the 
possibility of concluding that Boustead had declared the trust after remortgaging the 
estates to the Dutch company. However, the Court clearly held that the Comtesse was 
an absolute beneficiary of the estates48; and also held that Boustead’s trusteeship 
commenced from the moment the estates were conveyed to him.49 These findings 
mean that there is no possibility based on the timing of events that Boustead could 
have settled the full beneficial interest of the Delmar estates on the Comtesse. 
Secondly, did Boustead have, for a scintilla temporis, the unencumbered title 
to the Delmar estates? The cases which have dealt with this issue have emerged from 
a similar factual pattern, where property is purchased with the aid of a charge or 
mortgage from the outset. Essentially, the question to be determined is whether there 
exists a moment in time wherein the purchaser may be said to have owned the 
unencumbered fee simple of the estate. If the answer is in the affirmative, it would at 
least be theoretically possible for Boustead to have declared an oral express trust 
                                                
47 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 204. 
48 Ibid, 212. Of course, the Court also held that the Comtesse was subject to a lien in Boustead’s favour 
for his expenditures and expenses; but this does not mean that her interest was subject to the Dutch 
company’s interest obtained through Boustead’s remortgaging of the estates. 
49 Ibid, 206. 
 during that slice of time. The only case deciding the point before Rochefoucauld was 
Meux v Smith,50 which essentially decided that no such scintilla temporis exists. Meux 
was followed by the Court of Appeal in Re Connolly Bros (No 2),51 which held that 
there is no scintilla temporis.52 In Church of England BS v Piskor,53 Evershed MR 
distinguished Re Connolly Bros and Meux and came to the opposite conclusion. 
However, the House of Lords in Abbey National Building Society v Cann54 held this 
ground of distinction to be invalid,55 preferring instead to view the purchaser as never 
having acquired anything more than an equity of redemption. Ultimately, therefore, 
the decision in Meux has proven accurately to reflect the law; and the second possible 
reply also fails.  
(ii) Inconsistency with the judgment 
Furthermore, the Court’s judgment did not refer to any occurrence after the transfer 
which could be interpreted to be a declaration of the trust. Instead, the emphasis was 
in no uncertain terms on the initial agreement between the Comtesse and Boustead 
which preceded the transfer. It was held to be ‘quite clear that the conveyance to the 
defendant grew out of the arrangement which he and Duff were to have carried out, 
                                                
50 Meux v Smith (1843) 11 Sim 410, 59 ER 931. 
51 Re Connolly Bros (No 2) [1912] 2 Ch 25 (CA). 
52 Although Re Connolly Bros (No 2) did not explicitly rely on Meux, the effect of this was noted by 
Evershed MR in Church of England BS v Piskor [1954] Ch 553 (CA) 564. 
53 [1954] Ch 553 (CA) 564. 
54 Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56. In coming to this conclusion, the HL 
approved Re Connolly Bros (No 2); Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society v Jones [1951] 1 
All ER 901 (Ch) and Security Trust Co v Royal Bank of Canada [1976] AC 503 (PC); and overruled 
Piskor. 
55 [1991] 1 AC 56, 91. 
 and was made for precisely the same purpose’.56 Although Duff later ‘refused to carry 
it out’,57 the Court emphasised that the transfer to Boustead was pursuant to that 
initial agreement, and not to any subsequent act or declaration by him after receiving 
the estates. Not only did the Court speak of the defendant as having taken the 
conveyance ‘as a trustee’,58 in its final order it also ‘declared that the defendant 
purchased the Delmar estates as a trustee for the plaintiff’.59 These statements 
conclusively demonstrate that the Court was not enforcing a trust self-declared by 
Boustead; otherwise he would not have been said to have purchased the estates as a 
trustee. 
(iii) A further analytical inconsistency 
The analysis of Boustead as the settlor is also inconsistent with the development of 
the law since Rochefoucauld. Commentators agree that no ‘fraud’ arises when B, an 
owner of land, orally declares himself as trustee for A but fails to give effect to the 
declaration. As a result, section 53(1)(b) operates to prevent A from enforcing the 
orally-declared trust in this situation.60 Although there appears to be only one English 
decision on this point,61 a host of Commonwealth decisions62 adopt this position,63 
                                                
56 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 75 LT 505. 
57 Ibid, 505. 
58 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 206. 
59 Ibid, 212. 
60 See eg Feltham (n 38) 247; Youdan, ‘Formalities’ (n 38) 325; Hanbury and Martin (n 38) para 
3.005; M Pawlowski and K Everett, ‘Declarations of Trust and Unmarried Couples’ (1999) 29 Fam 
Law 721, 723; R Pearce, J Stevens and W Barr, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 15th edn 
(Oxford, OUP, 2010) 227; Underhill and Hayton (n 38) para 12.70; Hayton and Mitchell (n 38) para 
3.66. 
61 Smith v Matthews (1861) 3 De G F & J 139, 45 ER 831. 
 and appear to be based on sound principle. As Timothy Youdan points out, the ‘fraud’ 
exception does not apply here because ‘the general statements of the doctrine, 
including that of Lindley LJ in the Rochefoucauld case, refer to the trustee acquiring 
the property subject to a trust’.64 Indeed, ‘to hold otherwise would wholly frustrate the 
functions carried out by section 7’,65 leaving no room for that provision to apply. 
C.	   THE	  BASIS	  OF	  THE	  CONSTRUCTIVE	  TRUST	  IN	  
ROCHEFOUCAULD	  v	  BOUSTEAD	  
 
Given that none of the parties in Rochefoucauld could have possibly declared an oral 
express trust, this leads to the conclusion that the trust which was enforced in the case 
could not have been express. It is now necessary to consider the reasons why the 
constructive trust arose, on which Boustead was said to have taken the conveyance of 
the Delmar estates ‘as a trustee’. 
(1) Agency 
 
                                                                                                                                       
62 Morris v Whiting (1913) 15 DLR 254 (Manitoba KB); Organ v Sandwell [1921] VLR 622 (SC Vic) 
630; Permanent Trustee Co v Scales (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 391 Eq; Beemer v Brownridge [1934] 1 
WWR 545 (Sask CA) 555–56 and 567; Last v Rosenfeld [1972] 2 NSWLR 923 (NSW Sup Ct) 928, 
933; Wratten v Hunter [1978] 2 NSWLR 367 (NSW Sup Ct). 
63 The cases cited in nn 60–61 come from Youdan, ‘Formalities’ (n 38) 325, fn 2, and Feltham (n 38) 
247, n 6. 
64 Youdan, ‘Formalities’ (n 38) 325. 
65 Ibid, 325–26. 
 It may be observed that an agency relationship arose from the initial agreement 
between the Comtesse and Boustead. It is difficult to provide a precise definition of 
agency,66 but it is at least clear that, pursuant to their agreement, Boustead did act ‘on 
behalf of’67 the Comtesse.68 As Griffith CJ subsequently commented in the High 
Court of Australia, in Cadd v Cadd,69 ‘in [Rochefoucauld] the agency relied upon was 
proved. There was no question really raised about it, and the other consequences 
followed.’  
(a) The Agency in Rochefoucauld: Agent for the Purchase of Land 
Unlike the situations where an agent holds his principal’s property on the principal’s 
behalf70 and where an agent misuses his fiduciary position to make unauthorised 
gains,71 Rochefoucauld falls within the category of agency relationships involving an 
agent purchasing property from a third party vendor on behalf of his principal. Where 
the agent is an ‘agent for the purchase of land’,72 section 53(1)(b) may pose a 
potential hurdle to the principal’s case. Interestingly, the courts have made a 
                                                
66 See eg GHL Fridman, The Law of Agency, 7th edn (London, Butterworths, 1996) ch 1; FMB 
Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 18th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) Art 1. 
67 Underhill and Hayton (n 38) para 1.13. 
68 See too the headnote of the Law Times report which states that the Comtesse ‘alleged that 
[Boustead] bought the property as her agent’: Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 75 LT 502.  
69 Cadd v Cadd (1909) 9 CLR 171, 178. Feltham (n 38) 247 also treats Rochefoucauld as a case of 
agency. 
70 This includes cases where the agent has sold the principal’s property according to his instructions 
and holds the proceeds of sale (eg Burdick v Garrick (1870) LR 5 Ch App CA (Ch) 233); and where 
property is given to an agent to be used in the course of performing a service for his principal (eg 
Shallcross v Oldham (1862) 2 J & H 609, 70 ER 1202). 
71 See generally Bowstead and Reynolds (n 66) para 6.041; Underhill and Hayton (n 38) Art 27. 
72 Bowstead and Reynolds (n 66) para 2.037. 
 distinction between cases where the agent has only entered into a contract for sale 
with the vendor, and cases where he has proceeded to take the conveyance of the land. 
(i) Where the agent has merely contracted with the vendor 
Where an agent has merely entered into a contract with the vendor, ‘the estate in 
equity passes to the real purchaser’73 – that is, the principal – once the vendor signs 
the contract,74 regardless of whether the principal is disclosed by the agent to the 
vendor.75 This conclusion is reached by extension from the case involving contracts 
for the sale of land between two parties. Here, ‘the vendor is a constructive trustee for 
the purchaser of the estate from the moment the contract is entered into’,76 ‘to the 
extent to which [the vendee] has paid the purchase-money’.77 This is based on the 
premise that equity ‘considers all things to be done which ought to have been done’.78 
This is extended to tripartite cases where the purchaser is an agent: ‘following a long 
line of authorities’,79 the agency may be proved by parol evidence without 
contravening any statutory requirement of writing.80 The conclusion, therefore, is that 
                                                
73 Cave v Mackenzie (1877) 46 LJ Ch 564 (Ch) 567.  
74 See eg Wilson v Hart (1817) 7 Taunt 295, 129 ER 118; Heard v Pilley (1869) 4 Ch App 548 (CA); 
Cave (n 73). 
75 Bowstead and Reynolds (n 66) para 2.037.  
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case of Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321. 
77 Shaw (n 76) 349 (Lord O’Hagan). 
78 Ibid, 357 (Lord Hatherley LC). 
79 Cave (n 73) 567. 
80 In relation to s 4 of the Statute of Frauds, see eg Cave (n 73) 566 and Heard (n 74) 551. In relation to 
s 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and s 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989, see eg Target Holdings Ltd v Priestley (1999) 79 P&CR 305 (Ch) [53] and McLaughlin v Duffill 
[2008] EWCA Civ 1627, [2010] Ch 1 [15]–[24]. 
 ‘[t]he moment [the defendant] is agent he has not got the land at all. It is in equity 
vested in the principal, while at law it remains in the vendor.’81 
(ii) Where the agent has taken a conveyance 
In contrast, a different approach is taken where the agent has proceeded to take a 
conveyance of the land from the vendor. In this situation, ‘the agent holds as trustee 
and … the difficulty of [the statutory writing requirement] is not avoided simply 
because the original appointment as an agent did not require to be in writing.’82 More 
specifically, where ‘there had been a conveyance to the defendant … so that he was 
legal owner … the case [comes] within the 7th section [of the Statute of Frauds].’83 
As Bowstead and Reynolds observes, ‘[t]he assumption behind this rule is that … in 
the case of land, [a principal cannot] claim that conveyance to the agent vests property 
in the principal.’84 This view was taken in cases which pre-dated Rochefoucauld,85 
and was also assumed in Rochefoucauld itself.  
(b) Resolution of the Issue after Rochefoucauld 
The difference in approach is based on an apparently sound distinction in the courts’ 
interpretation of section 486 and section 7 of the Statute of Frauds. In the case of a 
                                                
81 Cave (n 72) 567. 
82 Du Boulay v Raggett (1989) 58 P & CR 138 (Ch) 151. See also Bowstead and Reynolds (n 65) para 
2.037; G Thomas and A Hudson, The Law of Trusts (Oxford, OUP, 2004) para 1.63. 
83 Cave (n 72) 565. 
84 Bowstead and Reynolds (n 65) para 6.109. 
85 See eg Mortlock v Buller (1804) 10 Ves Jun 292, 311; 32 ER 857, 864; Heard (n 74) 553; Cave (n 
73) 567. 
86 Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds provided that ‘no action shall be brought … upon any contract or 
sale of lands … unless the agreement… shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged 
therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised.’ 
 mere contract, the potential obstacle to the principal’s case – the oral appointment of 
the agent – is simply overcome by the view that ‘[section 4] shews, first, that it is not 
necessary that the agency should be proved by writing; and secondly, that you can 
prove the agency by parol and enforce the contract.’87 Conversely, where the agent 
has taken a conveyance of the land, the courts take it that there is a ‘trust or 
confidence of the land in the agent’,88 thus setting the case squarely within the scope 
of section 7.  
On the other hand, it would be troubling if the two cases yielded different 
results. As counsel for the plaintiff in James v Smith forcefully submitted, ‘it cannot 
… be contended that a man is to get into a better position by exaggerating his fraud by 
taking a conveyance.’89 In the eighteenth-century case of Bartlett v Pickersgill,90 the 
Statute of Frauds was indeed taken to prevent the principal from demanding the land 
from his agent who had taken a conveyance; and in James v Smith91 Kekewich J 
refused to overrule Bartlett. However, there were also authoritative decisions which 
cast serious doubts on the Bartlett approach. In Heard v Pilley,92 the Court of Appeal 
was strongly of the opinion that Bartlett was inconsistent with the rule that equity will 
not allow a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud93; and in Cave v Mackenzie, 
Jessel MR said that ‘where there has been a conveyance, different considerations [as 
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89 James v Smith [1891] 1 Ch 384 (Ch) 386. 
90 Bartlett v Pickersgill (1760) 1 Cox 15, 29 ER 1041. 
91 James v Smith (n 89). 
92 Heard (n 74). 
93 Ibid, 552 and 553. 
 compared to the case of a mere contract] probably arise; and that is shewn by the 
proviso which excepts a conveyance from the 7th section’.94 When Rochefoucauld 
came to be decided, the Court of Appeal laid the issue to rest by expressly rejecting 
Bartlett.95 Today, therefore, once an agency is proved, even if by parol evidence, the 
courts will never allow the agent to take advantage of section 53(1)(b), whether or not 
the agent has taken a conveyance.96 As Feltham observes, ‘[i]f B buys Blackacre from 
A and takes a conveyance, acting in whole or in part as agent for C, C's interest will 
be enforced although the agency is entirely oral.’97  
Whilst it is undeniably true that cases involving an agent for the purchase of 
land after Rochefoucauld are essentially reconciled, this does not explain the basis of 
the trust which was enforced in Rochefoucauld. One possibility is to analyse the case 
in terms of a declaration of trust of future property. 
(2) Trust of Future Property 
The law concerning the disposition of future property is well established.98 At law, a 
purported assignment of future property is wholly void and conveys nothing to the 
                                                
94 Cave (n 73) 567. The ‘proviso’ was clearly in reference to s 8 of the Statute of Frauds, which, in its 
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 intended assignee.99 Similarly, where future property is made the subject-matter of a 
declaration of trust, the trust is void for uncertainty.100 But where valuable 
consideration is given, equity will treat the assignment or declaration of the future 
property as a contract to assign the property. This becomes enforceable when the 
assignor receives the property.101 Since a trust of future property is void, the 
enforcement of the agreement will never involve enforcing the express trust. Rather, a 
constructive trust arises102 if there is consideration to secure the ‘transfer [of] the 
beneficial interest to the … purchaser immediately on the property being acquired’,103 
pursuant to the maxim that ‘equity considers as done that which ought to be done’.104 
It is necessary to consider how the facts and the judgment in Rochefoucauld might fit 
within this category of constructive trusts, which analyses Boustead as having 
declared the trust. 
(a) The Facts 
The basis of the initial agreement between the Comtesse and Boustead was that 
Boustead would hold the estates ‘for the benefit of the plaintiff’.105 Yet, at that time, 
he had not acquired the estates from the Dutch company, neither did he have any 
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100 Re Ellenborough [1903] 1 Ch 697 (Ch); Williams v CIR [1965] NZLR 395. 
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 present right to it. The merely expectant nature of the acquisition is emphasised by the 
fact that the carrying out of the agreement was contingent on Boustead submitting the 
winning bid at the auction of the estates.106 
It is also necessary to identify the ‘valuable consideration’ given by the 
Comtesse to justify treating the void trust as a contract to assign the estates. Such 
consideration ‘is sufficient if there be a benefit to the defendant or a detriment to the 
plaintiff’.107 This exercise is challenging if reference is made solely to the Official 
Report,108 which omits the Court’s statement of facts in its judgment. It might mislead 
one to assume, as Swadling assumes, that ‘the plantations were managed for [the 
Comtesse] by [Boustead]’ from the very beginning.109 In fact, the other reports 
consistently reveal that Boustead ‘was brought into the matter by Duff or by Mr 
Sabonadiere, the [Comtesse’s] agent in Ceylon’.110 Boustead was approached because 
he ‘had experience in the management of coffee estates and in receiving and 
disposing of consignments of coffee from them, and had business transactions with 
Mr Sabonadiere.’111  
It should be noted that Boustead was not initially an employee or a ‘friend’112 
of the Comtesse, but a manager of coffee estates and a businessman with a vested 
interest in making a profit out of the arrangement. He decided to proceed with the 
                                                
106 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 197–98. 
107 Edgeware Highway Board v Harrow Gas Co (1874) LR 10 QB 92, 95 (emphasis added). 
108 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 1 Ch 205. 
109 Swadling (n 15) 96. 
110 Rochefoucauld (CA) (n 1) 75 LT 505. 
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 agreement even after Duff had pulled out because he ‘hoped to become the 
[Comtesse’s] representative in England and the consignee of the produce of her 
estates, and he did not wish to break faith with the Dutch company.’113 It is unclear 
from the judgment whether Boustead did in fact become the Comtesse’s 
representative; but it is at least clear that, as part of the initial agreement with the 
Comtesse, she promised to hire Boustead ‘to work [the Delmar estates] as coffee 
plantations after he had acquired them’.114 The arrangement was not gratuitous: unlike 
Duff’s initial involvement, which was motivated by ‘considerations of friendship for 
the [Comtesse]’,115 Boustead did receive valuable consideration through being 
benefitted by the promise of employment.116 
Furthermore, the Court observed that ‘the Delmar estates were worth far 
more than the amount due to the Dutch company upon their mortgage’.117 There was 
surely no shortage of interest in the estates. Had the normal course of events taken 
place and the estates been sold without Boustead’s intervention, the Comtesse would 
have received a significant sum from the surplus of the sale. As part of the 
arrangement with Boustead, however, she gave up her equity of redemption to allow 
Boustead to purchase the estates at a price ‘sufficient to cover the debt, interest, and 
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 costs of the Dutch company’.118 The Comtesse’s act of giving up her equity of 
redemption was a detriment incurred pursuant to the agreement with Boustead.  
Indeed, the Comtesse’s giving up of her equity of redemption appears to 
have conferred yet another benefit on Boustead. It was earlier noted that ‘his actual 
payment out of pocket was under £5,000’, with the balance to the sum of £53,000 
coming from remortgaging the estates to the Dutch company.119 It is unlikely that the 
Dutch company, which was in liquidation,120 and which auctioned the estates in the 
first place because it wanted to call in the Comtesse’s mortgage, would have advanced 
a much higher sum to Boustead on the remortgage. By giving up her equity of 
redemption, therefore, the Comtesse may have benefitted Boustead, since he might 
not have been capable of financing the purchase of the estates had the price been 
significantly higher. 
(b) The Judgment 
Much of the judgment in Rochefoucauld was spent dismissing Boustead’s defences 
based on section 7 of the Statute of Frauds121 and the Statute of Limitations or 
laches.122 It was assumed to be unnecessary to determine the precise ground upon 
which the trust arose: it was sufficient that it did arise, loosely speaking, from ‘the 
circumstances under which the Delmar estates were conveyed to the defendant’.123 
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 Nonetheless, the judgment makes two clear points about the trust: first, the events 
which occurred before Boustead purchased the estates made him a trustee upon 
receipt124; and, secondly, an intention to create a trust was integral to the existence of 
the trust.125 The ‘trust of future property’ analysis accounts for these two points. The 
initial agreement between the Comtesse and Boustead evinced the latter’s intention to 
create a trust; and since the declaration over what was at that time merely future 
property was coupled with valuable consideration, Boustead took the estates ‘as a 
trustee’ of a constructive trust which bound him to carry out the initial agreement. 
Ultimately, however, this analysis does not satisfactorily explain the basis of 
the trust enforced in Rochefoucauld, which has never been understood as a trust of 
future property. Take Bannister v Bannister,126 for instance. The defendant, an elderly 
woman, conveyed two cottages to the claimant, her brother-in-law, on the 
understanding that she would be allowed to live rent-free in one of them for as long as 
she desired. Although Rochefoucauld provided authority for the proposition that a 
constructive trust had arisen for the claimant’s benefit,127 the decision was not based 
on a declaration of trust of future property.128 In addition, there are other categories of 
constructive trusts – the doctrine in Pallant v Morgan129 is one obvious example – 
where, similarly, a constructive trust arises in situations where an agreement is 
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 reached prior to the defendant obtaining the property in question. However, rather 
than characterising the defendant as having declared a trust over future property, the 
courts enforce the constructive trust based on some other, much broader grounds. It is 
thus necessary to explore what those grounds are. 
(3) Explaining Rochefoucauld: Constructive Trusts Responding to 
Intention and Reliance 
(a) Intention and Reliance 
In other categories of constructive trusts, such as those arising in the context of secret 
trusts,130 mutual wills131 and the doctrine in Pallant v Morgan,132 the constructive 
trusts arise in response to the elements of intention and reliance. In all of these cases, 
A transfers – or allows to be transferred – property to B pursuant to an oral promise 
by B to hold some beneficial interest in the property for A or C. The element of 
intention is shown by the agreement between A and B, where B promises to benefit A 
or C. The element of reliance arises through A’s transferring of (or allowing to be 
transferred) the property to B, where A suffers a detriment and/or B is conferred an 
advantage through the transfer.  
                                                
130 In these cases, the testator manifests to the apparent legatee his intention to benefit an ultimate 
beneficiary. The testator then leaves his will unchanged until his death in reliance on the apparent 
legatee’s agreement to fulfil the testator’s intention. A constructive trust binds the property received by 
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 (b) Intention and Reliance as Independent Causative Events in 
Rochefoucauld 
It is clear enough that the case of Rochefoucauld falls within this category of 
constructive trusts which responds to the elements of intention and reliance. Through 
the initial agreement, the parties’ intention was that Boustead would benefit the 
Comtesse with the equitable title of the estates. Pursuant to that intention, and relying 
on Boustead’s promise, she detrimentally gave up her valuable equity of redemption, 
allowing Boustead to purchase the estates at the amount outstanding on her mortgage 
rather than the full market price. She also incurred a detriment through ceasing to 
pursue other means of achieving the result she intended, and instead relied on 
Boustead to achieve the same. Furthermore, the Comtesse’s reliance not only 
conferred an advantage on Boustead by allowing him to obtain the legal title to the 
estates; he also benefitted from being allowed to manage the estates and to pursue his 
business interests pursuant to the arrangement.133 
(c) Explaining the Preference for the Intention and Reliance Analysis over 
the Trust of Future Property Analysis 
It was suggested earlier that the decision in Rochefoucauld could have been analysed 
on the trust of future property analysis.134 Indeed, many cases which fall to be 
analysed within the doctrine may be analysed in terms of a declaration of trust of 
future property, since the transferee in the cases always undertakes to hold property 
on trust prior to taking conveyance of that property. However, the fact that 
Rochefoucauld – and the doctrine it represents – has not been analysed on these terms 
is explicable in the light of the elements of intention and reliance.  
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 While trusts of future property appear to be contracts enforced pursuant to 
the ‘equity considers as done …’ maxim, on a closer look, it is more accurate to view 
the analysis as fundamentally requiring the element of reliance. A declaration of trust 
of future property will be re-characterised as a contract if, and only if, the intended 
beneficiary has given valuable consideration. It follows that it is a precondition for 
him to have relied on the settlor’s declaration before equity will intervene to enforce 
the declaration.135 However, reliance in the form of consideration is less compelling 
than reliance which arises through the transfer of the very property to which the 
promise relates. The giving up of property in reliance on the transferee’s promise is 
always more detrimental to the transferor and more advantageous to the transferee 
than reliance which arises through the giving of consideration, because the latter lacks 
an obvious link between the transferee’s promise (or intention) and the transferor’s 
reliance. As such, it is no surprise that the doctrine considers it unnecessary to react to 
the less certain form of reliance, and will always respond to the most certain form of 
reliance which arises through the transfer of property as reflected in the doctrine. 
D.	   THE	  DOCTRINE	  IN	  ROCHEFOUCAULD	  v	  BOUSTEAD:	  WHAT	  IS	  ‘FRAUD’?	  
In considering oral declarations of trust over land, the existence of ‘fraud’ is often 
seen as the crucial element which determines whether the Rochefoucauld doctrine will 
apply to give rise to a constructive trust, negating the requirement for writing. From 
the analysis of the doctrine as responding to the elements of intention and reliance, 
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 ‘fraud’ appears to have merely an auxiliary role, since it is not an event to which the 
doctrine responds. However, it is undeniable that the language of ‘fraud’ prevails in 
the doctrine, not least because it is used in the Court of Appeal’s statement of the 
doctrine in the case of Rochefoucauld itself. It is thus necessary to examine what 
‘fraud’ really means in the doctrine. First, however, a discussion of the nature of 
section 53(1)(b) is required, since ‘fraud’ is closely linked to the requirements of that 
section. 
(1) Nature of Section 53(1)(b) 
(a) The General View 
The phrase ‘manifested and proved by some writing’ in section 53(1)(b) has long 
been taken to ‘require the declaration to be evidenced by a signed writing and [that] in 
the absence of such writing the trust is valid although unenforceable’.136 Proponents 
of the constructive trust categorisation take the view that an enforceable ‘express trust 
is created by the settlor’s properly manifested intention to create that trust’.137 Thus, 
the lack of the requisite writing conclusively precludes the orally-declared trust from 
being enforced qua an express trust. Where the Rochefoucauld doctrine applies, these 
commentators claim that the courts are enforcing a constructive trust, the operation of 
which is exempted from the requirement for written evidence by section 53(2).138 
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 (b) The Disapplication Thesis 
Opposed to this analysis is the ‘disapplication thesis’ most cogently developed by 
William Swadling and Paul Matthews. This provides the most sophisticated case 
made for the express trust characterisation. Swadling takes the view that section 
53(1)(b) is not a rule of ‘enforceability’139 but one of ‘proof’140: it is ‘a rule of 
evidence’.141 To prevent the statute from being used as an instrument of fraud, the 
evidential requirement of writing is ‘disapplied’ on a finding of ‘fraud’, ‘with the 
result that there would be nothing standing in the way of the express trust’s 
“validity”.’142 The ‘disapplication’ of the requirement of writing removes any ‘barrier 
to the admission of the claimant’s oral testimony’ to prove the oral express trust,143 
‘and so whatever section 7 said, it could not have stood in the way … of the express 
trust’.144 This view is endorsed by Matthews, who says that, in Rochefoucauld, section 
                                                                                                                                       
… then and in every such case such trust or confidence shall be of the like force and effect as the same 
would have been if this statute had not been made’. 
139 Swadling (n 15) 107. 
140 Ibid, 108. 
141 Ibid, 113. 
142 Ibid, 105. 
143 Ibid, 105. 
144 Ibid, 107. See also W Swadling, ‘The Proprietary Effect of a Hire of Goods’ in N Palmer and E 
McKendrick (eds), Interests in Goods, 2nd edn (London, LLP, 1998) 511–12; W Swadling, ‘A Hard 
Look at Hodgson v Marks’ in P Birks and F Rose (eds), Restitution and Equity, Vol 1: Resulting Trusts 
and Equitable Compensation (Oxford, Mansfield Press, 2000) 66. In his most recent work, Swadling 
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undertakes a point-for-point rebuttal of the ‘arguments for classifying the Rochefoucauld trust as 
constructive’ in order to show that the trust was express: Swadling (n 15) 95 and 100–13. 
 7 of the Statute of Frauds did ‘not apply, on the basis that otherwise it would enable a 
fraud to be perpetrated’.145 He goes on to criticise the general view by remarking146: 
It is a complication that in some cases the judges who rely on the principle that equity 
will not allow the statute to be used as an instrument of fraud sometimes go on also to 
rely on s 53(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925, on the basis that this is a 
‘constructive’ trust … However, that is just inconsistent and wrong. It is one or the 
other; it cannot be both simultaneously. 
 
In his view, therefore, disapplying section 53(1)(b) leads to the direct enforcement of 
the oral express trust: it is inconsistent to justify the enforcement of the trust further 
by reference to section 53(2) through categorising it as a constructive trust. James 
Penner, too, contends that such reasoning is ‘fallacious’.147 
(2) Rejecting the Disapplication Thesis 
(a) Inconsistency with the Facts of Rochefoucauld 
Taken at face value, the disapplication thesis may seem plausible. After all, section 
53(1)(b) does not require declarations of trust over land to be created in writing; 
instead, such declarations must only be evidenced by some signed writing. Indeed, the 
general view admits that an oral declaration does create an express trust, albeit one 
not enforceable by the courts. However, given that there was no express trust which 
arose on the facts of Rochefoucauld, whether orally declared or otherwise, the case 
did not fall within the ambit of the formality requirements at all. This is to say, there 
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 were no (express) ‘declarations … of trusts … of any lands’ that had to be 
‘manifested and proved by some writing’. Even assuming that section 7 provided a 
rule of proof, its ‘disapplication’ in Rochefoucauld would prove nothing in the 
determination of the nature of the trust, since there was no (oral) express trust that 
could be enforced anyway.  
(b) Inconsistency with the Judgment in Rochefoucauld 
The analysis of section 7 as a rule of proof also does not sit well with the judgment in 
Rochefoucauld. According to Penner and Swadling148: 
[Section 7] is not concerned with enforceability but with proof, a logically prior 
question. If a declaration of trust is alleged to have been made but an application of 
the statute means that that allegation cannot be made good, there will in the eye of the 
court be no trust at all, not a valid but unenforceable one. 
 
This, taken with the disapplication thesis, suggests that the analytical sequence for 
determining whether section 53(1)(b) is ‘disapplied’ is that ‘fraud’ must be 
determined prior to the issue of proof. However, this is not reflected by the analysis in 
Rochefoucauld, where the Court of Appeal said that ‘it is a fraud on the part of a 
person to whom land is conveyed as a trustee … to deny the trust’.149 According to 
the judgment, then, it is a precondition for ‘fraud’ that the defendant is ‘a trustee’. 
Surely, it is only after considering all the relevant evidence that a court can determine 
whether he is or is not a trustee. The disapplication thesis thus mistakenly treats the 
existence of ‘fraud’ as a prerequisite for admitting the relevant evidence: 
Rochefoucauld clearly shows that evidence of the alleged trust is admitted, and the 
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 existence of the trust duly recognised, before the discussion of ‘fraud’ comes into 
play.150 
(c) Failure to Explain ‘Fraud’ 
A fundamental flaw of the thesis is that it does not make clear when a ‘fraud’ will 
arise. Proponents of this thesis do not appear to have given an answer, preferring 
instead to accept ‘fraud’ as given in the cases. For instance, Swadling acknowledges 
the fact that ‘there is no authoritative statement’ for ‘what amounts to fraud for the 
purpose of this doctrine’,151 yet he is content to say that the Court in Rochefoucauld 
‘disapplied [section 7] on perfectly orthodox and long-settled grounds’.152 Without 
explaining what those grounds are, the disapplication thesis substantially alters 
section 53(1)(b) by writing into it a word which is not there: that declarations of trusts 
over land ‘“may” be manifested and proved by some writing’. This omission has 
implications for the general analysis of the doctrine – indeed, even affecting cases 
where an oral express trust can be said to have been declared on the facts such as 
Bannister v Bannister. 
(d) Uncertainty in Determining the Parties’ Legal Positions 
Another difficulty with the disapplication thesis is the confusion it creates for parties 
who are reviewing their legal position prior to the initiation of proceedings. Suppose 
                                                
150 In fact, Swadling recognises the circularity of the issue: ‘[I]t is only once the evidence which the 
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 that a transferee who is genuinely in doubt concerning his legal position merely seeks 
a court’s declaration and does not assert that he is the rightful owner of the property in 
question. Will he be declared to be the absolute owner of the property, given that he 
has not yet actively relied on the statute as an ‘instrument of fraud’? Surely no court 
would make such a declaration, since, if the case were litigated, the transferee would 
be held to be a trustee. Yet how will the court justify its declaration otherwise, if the 
oral express trust is precisely within the ambit of (the yet-to-be-‘disapplied’) 
section 53(1)(b)? And what if, instead of the transferee, it is the transferor who seeks 
such a declaration? Swadling writes that section 53(1)(b) ‘was not addressed to 
settlors at all, but to litigants attempting to prove declarations of trust, who will 
generally be beneficiaries’.153 It follows that, since the transferor is the prospective 
litigant who wishes to prove the transferee’s oral declaration of trust, he should be 
advised by the court that evidence of some writing is necessary to prove the trust, 
consistently with section 53(1)(b). Should he then, on the strength of this advice, 
decide not to litigate because he is unable to produce the written evidence needed? It 
is clear that the disapplication thesis must also be rejected for causing these 
regrettable confusions in defining the parties’ legal standing. 
(3) What is ‘Fraud’? 
(a) Not Relying on Section 53(1)(b) 
The first point of principle to be observed is that ‘it is not “fraud” to rely on legal 
rights conferred by Act of Parliament’.154 Even if it is argued that section 53(1)(b) 
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 does not confer a ‘legal right’ but acts merely as a ‘rule of evidence’, the principle 
remains, given that it is a valid rule conferred by Parliament.155 This principle is made 
clear in the self-declaration cases, where an owner of property, B, orally declares a 
trust over his property for the benefit of A. As observed earlier,156 B is able to rely on 
section 53(1)(b) if he changes his mind, rendering ‘fraud’ irrelevant in self-declaration 
cases.157 Thus, beyond merely relying on the statute, there must be something more in 
the way the statute is or might be used for a ‘fraud’ to arise. 
(b) Involves a Conveyance 
In Rochefoucauld, the Court of Appeal observed that a ‘proof of a fraud’ will involve 
proving that ‘the grantee … is … relying upon the form of conveyance and statute, in 
order to keep the land himself’.158 This suggests that, in addition to section 53(1)(b), 
the existence of a conveyance is central to the meaning of ‘fraud’. Thus, self-
declaration cases never involve a conveyance to A because B already owns the 
property in question, while such a conveyance is always a feature in the Bannister-
type cases where B receives A’s land on the express oral understanding that B is to 
hold some beneficial interest in the land on trust for A.159 Whenever a conveyance 
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 takes place, the true nature of the transaction is fundamental to determining the 
respective rights and obligations of the parties. This significantly varies depending on 
whether the true nature of the conveyance is a transfer as a gift, by virtue of a sale, 
pursuant to a trust arrangement, as a security, etc. In the Bannister-type cases, the 
existence of the conveyance means that the courts must determine whether the true 
nature of the transaction is an outright transfer to B, or whether there is something 
more than an absolute conveyance.  
(c) Cloaks the True Nature of the Conveyance 
To discover the meaning of ‘fraud’, the possible arguments in the Bannister-type 
cases must be considered. One possible argument in B’s favour is to rely on the 
statute in his attempt to prevent the enforcement of the oral express trust. Since it is 
not a ‘fraud’ to rely on the statute per se, in essence B will succeed on this point and 
the oral express trust will not be enforced. In reply, A may seek to show that the 
conveyance to B was in reliance on B’s manifested intention to hold some beneficial 
interest in the property for A. If this is shown then A will have established the 
elements of intention and reliance to give rise to a constructive trust, which may be 
enforced through section 53(2). The only way in which B may make use of section 
53(1)(b) to counter this argument is to combine the wording of the statute with the 
conveyance deed in hand. The argument is rather persuasive: if section 53(1)(b) 
requires a declaration of trust concerning land to be proved by some writing, and if the 
only proof available is the absolute form of conveyance to B, there can therefore be 
no enforceable trust consistent with the statute. In his attempt to establish himself as 
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 the rightful owner of the property, B is essentially attempting to cloak the discovery 
of the true nature of the transaction. However, the attempt fails to prevent the 
enforcement of the constructive trust which arises from the circumstances of the 
transaction, and which is excepted from the formality requirement of section 53(1)(b) 
by virtue of section 53(2). Furthermore, the law signifies its manifest disapproval of 
such an attempt by labelling it a ‘fraud’. ‘Fraud’, therefore, relates to the attempt to 
use the absolute form of the conveyance in combination with section 53(1)(b) to cloak 
the true nature of the transaction. 
(d) ‘Fraud’ in Context: A Description 
There are two ways in which the term ‘fraud’ may be used in the doctrine. It may act 
merely as an abridgement of the maxim ‘a statute may not be used as an instrument of 
fraud’; or it may take on a meaning independent of the maxim. The difference 
between the two, although subtle, is of crucial importance to the proper analysis of the 
doctrine. The point may be illustrated by reference to Scott LJ’s description of ‘fraud’ 
in Bannister v Bannister, where he observed160: 
The fraud which brings the principle into play arises as soon as the absolute character 
of the conveyance is set up for the purpose of defeating the beneficial interest, and 
that is the fraud to cover which the Statute of Frauds or the corresponding provisions 
of the Law of Property Act, 1925, cannot be called in aid in cases in which no written 
evidence of the real bargain is available. 
 
Where the meaning of ‘fraud’ is divorced from the maxim, it might be thought that 
the doctrine is engaged if, and only if, the absolute form of the conveyance is 
positively used to cloak the true nature of the transaction. A similar view might be 
taken of the Court of Appeal’s words in Rochefoucauld that ‘it is a fraud on the part 
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 of [the transferee] … to deny the trust and claim the land himself’161: a positive denial 
of the trust might appear to be a pre-condition for the application of the doctrine. 
This is, however, inaccurate in the light of the maxim. The statement that 
‘section 53(1)(b) may not be used as an instrument of fraud’ remains wholly relevant, 
even in a case where the transferee has not actively set up the form of the conveyance 
to deny the transferor’s interest. In Scott LJ’s terms, the emphasis of the maxim is not 
on the ‘setting up’ of the form of the conveyance nor the ‘defeating’ of the other’s 
interest, but rather on the fact that the statute ‘cannot be called in aid’ in such a case. 
Similarly, the emphasis in Rochefoucauld was not on the transferee’s active ‘denial of 
the trust’, but on the fact that ‘the Statute of Frauds does not prevent the proof of a 
fraud’.162  
Thus, although ‘fraud’ relates to the attempt to use the absolute form of the 
conveyance and the statute to cloak the discovery of the true nature of the transaction, 
the reference to ‘fraud’ does not presume that the transferee has in fact attempted to 
do so. Rather, ‘fraud’ merely describes a state of affairs163 – the cloaking of the true 
nature of the transaction using the conveyance deed and section 53(1)(b). More 
specifically, ‘fraud’ describes the state of affairs which the constructive trust prevents 
– the ‘defeating’ or ‘denial’ of the trust using the conveyance. This is consistent with 
the analysis of intention and reliance as the causative events of the doctrine, since the 
causative events are those that would make a denial of the true nature of the 
transaction a ‘fraud’, not the occurrence of such an act of denial. 
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 E.	   A	  CLOSER	  LOOK	  AT	  ‘FRAUD’	  
(1) Not a Causative Event 
One danger of giving ‘fraud’ a meaning divorced from the maxim is that it encourages 
the ‘defeating’ or ‘denial’ of the trust to be viewed as a causative event triggering 
application of the doctrine. For instance, according to the disapplication thesis, 
section 53(1)(b) is disapplied only when an act of ‘fraud’ is actively perpetrated by 
the transferee. In this vein, Tony Oakley writes, ‘what brings about the intervention of 
equity is the acquisition of property on the strength of an oral undertaking … followed 
by an attempt to renege on the undertaking … because of the lack of the necessary 
statutory formalities.’164 This seems to suggest that the constructive trust arises in 
response to the recipient’s wrong in reneging on the undertaking, when this is clearly 
not required to give rise to the doctrine. Given that ‘fraud’ is a malleable concept in 
equity, taking it to be a causative event may even lead to fundamental 
misunderstandings of the law. For instance, in Hodgson v Marks, Ungoed-Thomas J 
held at first instance that the ‘fraud’ exception was available even against a bona fide 
purchaser who only discovers the trust after the purchase.165 This mistaken view was 
perhaps prompted by the misconceived idea that it is wrong – and thus a ‘fraud’ – for 
a purchaser who later discovers a trust to refuse to honour it. 
The conceptualisation of ‘fraud’ as a causative event leads to inexorable 
analytical difficulties. Consider the period of time between the conveyance of the 
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 property and the transferee’s reneging on his undertaking. If the act of reneging is a 
causative event, it follows that, in this period, A has no rights under a constructive 
trust, since the doctrine has not yet been engaged, neither can the transferor enforce 
the transferee’s oral express undertaking, since this is prevented by section 53(1)(b). 
Not only will this put the parties in a state of deadlock, it may also be that any profits 
made out of the property, for instance pertaining to rents received from the tenants in 
the meantime, may be kept by the transferee. This perverse state of affairs does not 
reflect the law.  
The point may be put in another way. Suppose that the transferor dies 
immediately after he conveys the property pursuant to the transferee’s undertaking. 
There is no doubt that the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead will enable the 
transferor’s heirs or estate to enforce the undertaking against the transferee, even 
though the transferee had not reneged on his undertaking. Or suppose that the 
transferee dies instead of the transferor immediately after the conveyance.166 Here, the 
impossibility of the transferee reneging on his undertaking is indisputable; yet few 
would deny that the transferor may enforce the transferee’s undertaking against his 
heirs or estate.  
These observations demonstrate that the application of the Rochefoucauld 
doctrine entails a substantive interest arising prior to and irrespective of any later act 
of the transferee. The proprietary right arises to bind the transferee from the outset – 
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 that is, from the moment the conveyance is completed. As Millett LJ observed in 
Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co, the transferee’s ‘possession of the 
property is coloured from the first by the trust and confidence by means of which he 
obtained it’.167 Such a right, and the corresponding obligation, arises pursuant to a 
constructive trust which responds to the causative elements of intention and reliance. 
This analysis allows the parties – and the courts – to determine with certainty that the 
transferee will always be bound by a constructive trust once the true substance of the 
conveyance reflects the elements of intention and reliance.  
(2) The Symbiosis between ‘Fraud’ and the Constructive Trust 
Besides acting as a description of a state of affairs, the concept of ‘fraud’ (as an 
abridgement of the maxim) serves as an emphasis of the context in which the doctrine 
is relevant. In Rochefoucauld, the transferee was described as ‘a person to whom land 
is conveyed as a trustee, and who knows it was so conveyed’.168 ‘Fraud’ is thus 
relevant only in situations where the elements of intention and reliance arise on the 
facts – the intention being reflected in the ‘knowledge’ of the transferee, and the 
reliance arising through the transferor’s conveyance of the property to him. This 
serves to accentuate the close link between the term ‘fraud’ and the existence of the 
constructive trust. Inasmuch as section 53(2) ‘does not affect the creation or operation 
of … constructive trusts’, it allows proof of the causative events of constructive trusts. 
To the same extent, therefore, it allows ‘the proof of a fraud’169 – that is, proof of the 
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 elements of intention and reliance – in spite of any attempts to use the form of 
conveyance to deny this. 
(3)  ‘Fraud’ in Rochefoucauld 
Given the intimate link between ‘fraud’ and the constructive trust, it follows that the 
doctrine is not related to, neither does it enforce, the oral express trust on the facts, 
contrary to the analysis of the disapplication thesis. This point is clearly discernible 
from the judgment in Rochefoucauld. Given that there was no oral express trust on the 
facts, the case did not fall at all within the ambit of section 7 of the Statute of Frauds, 
which affects only oral express trusts to render them unenforceable. Even if section 7 
ceased to exist, there still would not have been an express trust on the facts. 
Nonetheless, it was still possible for Boustead to have used the absolute form of the 
conveyance, together with section 7, to cloak the discovery of the constructive trust. 
This possibility made it necessary for the Court to speak of ‘fraud’ – that is, to 
describe the case as one in which the enforcement of a constructive trust would avoid 
the cloaking of the true nature of the transaction.  
It is, therefore, unnecessary for the facts of a case to fall within the ambit of 
section 53(1)(b) in order for the doctrine in Rochefoucauld to apply. Instead, the facts 
must give rise to the elements of intention and reliance to engage the doctrine. In 
order for the term ‘fraud’ to be relevant in the doctrine, there must also be the 
possibility of the transferee using the conveyance and section 53(1)(b) to cloak the 
discovery of the elements of intention and reliance on the facts. Furthermore, given 
that an act of ‘fraud’ is not a causative event of the trust, it is seems unnecessary to 
 couch the emphasis of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld in terms of a ‘fraud doctrine’170 
or a ‘fraud’ exception. Rather, it is a more accurate reflection of the doctrine to treat it 
as a sui generis sub-category of constructive trusts which responds to the elements of 
intention and reliance.  
F.	   CONCLUSION	  
Contrary to recent claims, the trust which was enforced in Rochefoucauld v Boustead 
was clearly a constructive trust, since none of the parties involved was capable of 
declaring an express trust. In the context of agency, Rochefoucauld established a new 
category of constructive trust, where an agent who takes a conveyance from a third 
party will always be bound by a constructive trust for the benefit of his principal. 
Arguably, the trust in the case itself might be explained as an example of a 
constructive trust arising in the context of the ‘trust of future property’ analysis. 
However, the lack of support given to this analysis in cases which have relied on 
Rochefoucauld suggests that a better explanation may be proffered: that it gave rise to 
a constructive trust which responded to the elements of intention and reliance, 
consistent with other categories of constructive trusts.  
The ‘disapplication thesis’, which favours the view that the doctrine 
‘disapplies’ section 53(1)(b) to allow the enforcement of the oral express trust, is 
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 unworkable. The doctrine in Rochefoucauld entails that section 53(1)(b) renders an 
oral express trust unenforceable; instead, it enforces a constructive trust where the 
causative elements of intention and reliance are fulfilled on the facts. ‘Fraud’ is 
merely a description of the state of affairs which the constructive trust prevents – the 
transferee’s reneging on his undertaking through using the absolute form of the 
conveyance and section 53(1)(b) to deny the true nature of the conveyance.  
